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The goal of the current work is to delineate national judicial responses to
Commission-issued competition soft law within two EU jurisdictions – the
UK and the Netherlands. A comparative methodology is adopted and – in
terms of theory – several hypotheses of possible judicial attitudes to soft
law are established. In broad terms, it is ventured that courts can either
recognize (agreement, disagreement, persuasion) or refuse to recognize
(neglect, rejection) supranational soft law in their judicial discourse. While
acknowledging that judicial refusal for recognition is a natural judicial
response to legally non-binding instruments, the paper argues that
competition soft law could and should become recognized by national
courts of law because that would contribute positively to the enforcement
system’s goals of consistency and the concomitant legal certainty and
uniform application. The empirical picture that transpires, however, reveals
a varied recognition landscape that could well pose challenges for
consistent enforcement.
Keywords: soft law; EU competition law; antitrust; guideline; notice;
communication; national court; national judiciary; case law; recognition
Introduction – setting the scene, theoretical underpinnings and
methodology
Setting the scene
More than a decade after the great bulk of day-to-day enforcement of Articles 101
and 102 TFEU was put in the hands of national authorities and courts, the decen-
tralized and substantively “more economic” EU competition regime seems to have
matured enough to lend itself to an empirical analysis. This is evidenced by the
increasing amount of studies and country reports that aim at compiling national
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administrative and judicial decisions,1 thus measuring the output and performance
of the now multi-level competition enforcement regime established by the so-
called “Modernization” Regulation 1/2003.2 The current paper also strives to con-
tribute to this burgeoning discussion on national developments by choosing a very
particular focus. Namely, the aim is to comparatively inquire into the ways in
which and the extent to which national judiciaries engage with Commission-
issued competition soft law. The latter term refers to the non-binding guidelines,
communications and notices authored by the European Commission, where the
institution explains its enforcement practice and the law of EU competition
policy. The narrow question of this work is warranted because of the increased
importance these instruments acquire in the currently decentralized competition
enforcement regime. As Professor Colomo puts it,
Nowadays, following the formal dismantlement of the system requiring the ex-ante
notification of agreements, it is difficult to see how the practical value of the guide-
lines is fundamentally different from that of “hard law” instruments, even though
they do not have a comparable legal status from a formal standpoint.3
Other scholars also acknowledge the great weight soft law instruments have
acquired in the competition field, with some lamenting this development4 and
others applauding it.5 The latter normative stances, however, do not answer the
question of the legal, and not just practical, status of supranational competition
soft law in EU Member States. Going beyond the undisputed fact that suprana-
tional competition soft law does not have binding force, this paper ponders into
1For a study: B Rodger, Competition Law, Comparative Private Enforcement and Collec-
tive Redress Across the EU (Wouters Kluwer 2014). For country reports: A Maton and
others, ‘Update on the Effectiveness of National Fora in Europe for the Practice of Antitrust
Litigation’ (2012) 3 Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 586; B Rodger,
Ten Years of UK Competition Law Reform (Dundee University Press 2010); I Kokkoris,
Competition Cases from the European Union (Sweet & Maxwell 2008).
2Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2002] OJ L 001/1.
On the multi-level governance debate, refer to F Cengiz, ‘Multi-level Governance in Com-
petition Policy: The European Competition Network’ (2010) 35 European Law Review
660–77.
3P Colomo, ‘Three Shifts in EU Competition Policy: Towards Standards, Decentralization,
Settlements’ (2013) 20 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 363, 370.
4W Weiss, ‘After Lisbon, Can the European Commission Continue to Rely on “Soft Legis-
lation” in Its Enforcement Practice?’ (2011) 2 Journal of European Competition Law and
Practice 441–51.
5On a positive stance to soft law more generally, refer to D Sarmiento, ‘European Soft Law
and National Authorities: Incorporation, Enforcement and Interference’ in J Ilianopoulos-
Strangas (ed), The Soft Law of European Organisations (SIPE 2012). On competition
soft law specifically, refer to C Vincent, ‘La Force Normative des Communications et
Lignes Directrices en Droit Européen de la Concurrence’ in C Thibierge (ed), La Force Nor-
mative: Naissance d’un Concept (Bruylant 2009) 693–703.































the legal effects (as distinct from legal force)6 that these instruments produce at
national level and centres the empirical inquiry on national judiciaries. As ultimate
instances of normative ordering within Member States,7 national courts have the
non-trivial task of clarifying the legal effect(s) of supranational competition soft
law at the national level, thus contributing to the enhancement of the principles
of certainty and consistency so central to Regulation 1/2003.8 As Stefan notes,
“in the absence of judicial recognition, soft law fails to accomplish some of its
key objectives, such as fostering legal certainty, transparency, and the consistent
application of rules in the EU multi-level governance system”.9
It also needs to be acknowledged that certain scholarly accounts stipulate that
soft law does not have any decisive influence in and of itself because, being a re-
statement of case law, it is used by courts as a shorthand for the latter and nothing
more.10 Without discounting judicial “shorthand” use of soft law for which there is
ample evidence,11 works such as that of Stefan12 also show that a normative dia-
logue and cross-fertilization happens between supranational soft instruments and
supranational case law – a phenomenon which would not have been possible had
6On the distinction between legal force and effects, refer to L Senden, Soft Law in European
Community Law (Its Relationship to Legislation) (Hart Publishing 2004) 264–9.
7For the importance of national courts as ultimate instances of normative ordering, see M
Dawson, ‘Three Waves of New Governance in the European Union’ (2011) 36 European
Law Review 208, 223–5; J Scott and S Sturm, ‘Courts as Catalysts: Re-thinking the Judicial
Role in New Governance’ (2006) 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 565–94; D Panke,
‘Social and Taxation Policies – Domaine Reserve Fields? Member States Non-compliance
with Sensitive European Secondary Law’ (2009) 31 Journal of European Integration 489,
491; R Slepcevic, ‘The Judicial Enforcement of EU Law Through National Courts: Possi-
bilities and Limits’ (2009) 16 Journal of European Public Policy 378, 382.
8Article 3 and paras 14, 17, 21, 22, 29 of the Preamble to Regulation 1/2003 [2002]. For
scholarly accounts on the matter, refer to E Herlin-Karnell and T Konstadinides, ‘The
Rise and Expressions of Consistency in EU Law: Legal and Strategic Implications for Euro-
pean Integration’ in Catherine Barnard (ed), Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal
Studies (Hart 2013) 139, 143 and H Cosma and R Whish, ‘Soft Law in the Field of EU
Competition Policy’ (2003) 14 European Business Law Review 25–56.
9O Stefan, ‘Helping Loose Ends Meet? The Judicial Acknowledgement of Soft Law as a
Tool of Multi-level Governance’ (2014) 21Maastricht Journal of European and Compara-
tive Law 359, 359.
10For a summary of the arguments of this critique, H Greene, ‘Guideline Institutionaliza-
tion: The Role of Merger Guidelines in Antitrust Discourse’ (2006) 48 William and
Mary Law Review 771, 830. The author also states that shorthand usage of soft law actually
contributes to soft law’s influence rather than detract from it. ibid 831.
11Especially when establishing the legal framework applicable to a case, courts do use soft
law as a shorthand for case law. For instance, refer to case Bookmakers’ Afternoon Grey-
hound Services Limited and others v Satellite Information Service Limited and others
[2008] EWHC 1978 (Ch), Part 5: The Law, paras 289–410.
12Stefan (n 9). See also Oana Stefan, Soft Law in Court: Competition Law, State Aid and the
































the former been a mere re-statement of the latter.13 The task at hand here is to
establish whether a similar phenomenon is also observable at the national level.
This paper will thus proceed as follows – the first section will continue by dis-
cussing the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of the study. The second
section will present the sample of detected soft law observations in an aggregate-
comparative manner and then engage in a detailed discussion of the cases, putting
the individual references in context. The third section will outline general trends
that stand out from the observed judicial attitudes. Based on patterns spotted,
plausible (but non-testable) reasons for the empirical findings will be suggested.
Ultimately, conclusions will be drawn as to the effects of the empirical obser-
vations on the system’s goal of consistency (and the concomitant legal certainty
and uniform application). This will be done in the fourth section.
Theoretical underpinnings
The backdrop against which the empirical observations generated are going to be
examined is a theoretical framework developed elsewhere14 that puts forward
several hypotheses of possible judicial attitudes to supranational competition
soft law. Those attitudes broadly fit into two categories – judicial “recognition”
and judicial “refusal (for recognition)”. In particular, it is hypothesized that the
judiciary can be open to interpretation of soft law – “recognition” – in which
case it explicitly engages (agrees or disagrees) with the content of the said instru-
ments in its reasoning. This attitude implies a flexible judicial approach to legal
sources. Another manifestation of the flexible approach is the so-called “persuaded
judiciary” response.15 It hypothesizes that it is also possible that courts do not
explicitly mention soft law in their judgments, but the reasoning therein coincides
with the substantive content and logic proposed in the latter instruments.
Alternatively, the “refusal (for recognition)” scenario entails that courts exhibit
a resistant attitude to soft law that implies a formalistic view on legal sources.
Refusal, it is hypothesized, can manifest itself through either explicit rejection
(the flip side of explicit recognition) or neglect (the flip side of persuasion),
whereby the soft law instrument is ignored even if invoked in an argument
13Greene (n 10) 831 shows that the ability of soft law (the US Merger Guidelines) to inde-
pendently influence the path of the law is very much present and exists beyond (on top of)
the possibility of substantive overlaps between case law and soft law.
14ZR Georgieva, ‘Soft Law in EU Competition Law and Its Judicial Reception in Member
States – ATheoretical Perspective’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal 223–60. A similar fra-
mework is employed by Greene in her study on judicial attitudes to the Merger Guidelines
in the US – Greene (n 10) 807.
15The idea for the latter scenario is explained (although in different terms) in F Schauer,
Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Harvard University
Press 2009), 72. For the Dutch context, a similar intuition is expressed in M Eliantonio,
‘Effectieve Rechtsbescherming en Netwerken: een Problematische Verhouding’ (2011)
59 SEW: Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch Recht 116–22.































made by the parties to the dispute. In this set-up, and following Stefan quoted
above, it is hypothesized that flexible interpretations, by enhancing a dialogue
between the national and supranational levels through means of soft law
(among others),16 foster the achievement of consistency in enforcement (and the
concomitant legal certainty and uniform application). To the contrary, by prevent-
ing dialogue, black-letter, doctrinal approaches detract from the said principles.
Finally, the above-proposed model acknowledges that other, more legally
legitimate, consistency-enhancing tools are available to the decentralized compe-
tition enforcement system. The Treaty-based preliminary rulings procedure, the
amicus curiae interventions based on Article 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003 and
the Article 10-based declaratory decisions are just some of the prominent
examples.17 However, as Boskovits notes, these strict convergence rules generate
a re-defined relationship between national courts, on the one hand, and the national
and supranational administrative authorities, on the other. This has an impact on
administration of justice in Member States.18 Therefore, the author argues, “It
remains to be seen the way in which the Commission intends to make use of
the powerful instruments at its disposal as to avoid alienating national
judges.”19 Indeed, possible Commission fears for national judicial backlash
might be the reason why amicus briefs have been issued rather sparingly
through the years.20 So far, declaratory decisions have not been issued21 and pre-
liminary rulings in competition law have remained steady in numbers in compari-
son to the period 1958–2004.22 The possibility cannot be discounted, therefore,
that one channel through which convergence could happen is the voluntary judi-
cial acceptance of principles enunciated in supranational competition soft law. As
16This is assuming that bottom-up (and not only top-down) alignments of judicial discourse
are possible. In this regard, Gerber and Cassinis stipulate that “In sum, the new system
emphasizes a general expectation of systemic consistency with the decisional practice of
the Commission as well as with its competition policy guidelines. The Member State auth-
orities play an important role in establishing these guidelines.” See D Gerber and P Cassinis,
‘The “Modernization” of European Community Competition Law: Achieving Consistency
in Enforcement: Part 1’ (2006) 27 European Competition Law Review 10, 15.
17Those should be read together with the obligations imposed by Article 16 and 3 of Regu-
lation 1/2003 [2002].
18K Boskovits, ‘Modernization and the Role of National Courts: Institutional Choices,
Power Relations, and Substantive Implications’ in I Lianos and I Kokkoris (eds), The
Reform of EC Competition Law, vol 41 (Kluwer Law International 2010) 95, 111.
19ibid 116.
20For the period 2004–2015, there are only 17 amicus curiae briefs listed on the website of
DG COMP. See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/antitrust_amicus_curiae.html
accessed on 20 January 2016.
21MJ Frese, Sanctions in EU Competition Law: Principles and Practice (Hart Publishing
2014) 163.
22For data on the period 1958–2004, refer to B Rodger, ‘Article 234 and Competition Law:
A Comparative Analysis’ (2008) 15Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law
































Snyder puts it (in the context of the interaction between the Commission and the
supranational courts),
In seeking to determine the meaning of Commission soft law in practice, we need to
view the Commission and the court in interaction: [… ] as each having an effect on
the other, such that the result of each institution’s decisional processes are incorpor-
ated as an input into the decisional processes of the other.23
In this sense, the fact that soft law instruments are recursive and get updated on
regular intervals largely based on the dialogue EU Courts-Commission, makes
of them a useful tool for the (national) judiciary to consider.
Determining whether the thus-described supranational horizontal interaction
also happens vertically – as between the Commission/EU Courts, on the one
hand, and national courts, on the other, is the objective of this work. Possible
convergence happening through the European Competition Network is therefore
not taken into account although it could have an impact, especially under
national public enforcement of EU competition rules. Finally, the possibility
that the national judiciary refuses recognition of supranational competition
soft law figures prominently in the model, but is a normatively sub-optimal
option due to the above-described consistency-enhancing potential of the recog-
nition model.
Methodology
The empirical results of the study are presented in a comparative legal framework
that enables their critical analysis. Namely, the focus is on bringing out the simi-
larities and differences in national judicial recognition of supranational compe-
tition soft law, while searching for a common pattern (core) across Member
States.24 The comparative method also allows for a finding of no commonality
23F Snyder, ‘Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community’ in S Martin
(ed), The Construction of Europe (Springer 1994) 196, 204. In the more specific context of
the Article 82 Guidance Paper, similar views are expressed by RWhish, ‘National Compe-
tition Law Goals and the Commission’s Guidance on Article 82 EC: The UK Experience’ in
LF Pace (ed), European Competition Law: The Impact of the Commission’s Guidance on
Article (vol 102, Edward Elgar Publishing 2011) 152, 161 and D Sinclair, ‘Counterfactuals
– A Shift in the Burden/Standard of Proof’ (2010) GCR Antitrust Litigation Conference
2010 1, 4.
24See M Bussani and U Mattei, ‘The Common Core Approach to European Private Law’
(1996–1997) 3 Columbia Journal of European Law 339–56. See also B Fekete, ‘Raising
Points of Law on the Court’s Own Motion? Two Models of European Legal Thinking’
(2014) 21 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 652–75. Because the
supranational instruments that are object of this study are identical for all Member States,
no caveats need to be made with regard to the core comparative concern of picking
similar objects of analysis (tertium comparationis) across jurisdictions, or in other words,
comparing “like with like” (similia similibus). On the importance of the tertium being































in judicial approaches towards supranational soft law, which would be a result of
equal value for the purposes of this work.
In that set-up, the jurisdictions selected for the study are the Netherlands and
the UK – belonging to different legal traditions, while at the same time not lacking
in commonalities. Firstly, what the jurisdictions have in common is that they both
introduced their modern, EU-aligned competition enforcement regimes in the late
1990s.25 Additionally, Idot testifies that exactly those two EUMember States were
among the most prolific in drafting their own national soft law in the early 2000s.26
Despite the fact that this study touches upon nationally issued competition soft law
only marginally, the latter’s increased usage in both the Netherlands and the UK is
likely to shape a more open attitude to supranational soft instruments as well.
Differences between the jurisdictions could also be expected – namely, due to
the different approaches to administratively issued guidance under the common
and civil law traditions, the particular judicial responses to supranational soft
law could differ. Concretely, the less structured way in which the UK legal
system copes with legally non-binding instruments27 is to be contrasted with
the elaborate and compartmentalized approach evinced by the Netherlands.28
The current paper is going to focus on national judicial recognition of supra-
national competition soft law in both private and public competition disputes. The
areas of EU Competition law under study are Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (dealing
with anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance, respectively). The
related domains of EU State Aid and EU Merger control are not subject to decen-
tralized (national) enforcement, so the parameters of the current study naturally
exclude them. Sectoral regulation under Article 106 TFEU is also excluded
because of its different institutional set-up.29 National sectoral regulation case
law is thus only considered if it contains references to supranational competition
(Article 101 and 102 TFEU) soft law.
similar between jurisdictions, see E Orucu, ‘Methodology of Comparative Law’ in Jan
Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar 2006) 442, 448.
25The Dutch Competition Act (Medidingingswet) was adopted on 22 May 1997 <http://
wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0008691/2014-08-01> accessed 26 April 2016 and the UK
Competition Act was first published in 1998 <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/
41/contents> accessed 26 April 2016.
26L Idot, ‘À Propos de L’Internationalisation du Droit: Réflexions sur la Soft Law en Droit
de la Concurrence’ in Collectif (ed), Vers de Nouveaux Équilibres entre Ordres Juridiques :
Liber Amicorum Hélène Gaudemet-Tallon (Dalloz 2008) 85, 91.
27R Baldwin and J Houghton, ‘Circular Arguments: The Status and Legitimacy of Admin-
istrative Rules’ (1986) Public Law 239–84.
28HE Broring and GJA Geertjes, ‘Bestuursrechtelijke Soft Law in Nederland, Duitsland en
Engeland’ (2013) 4 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Bestuursrecht 74–87.
29Under Article 106 TFEU, NCAs have no decision-making powers: only the Commission
and national courts can apply that provision. This creates different inter-institutional inter-

































When it comes to selection of soft law for this study, it merits observing that
the instruments that could be subsumed under the term “Commission-issued com-
petition soft law” are of considerable quantity, even if one looks at the enforcement
framework of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU only.30 The current paper therefore
chooses to focus on those instruments that lay down the substantive principles
that the European Commission deems applicable to the analysis of practices
under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The reason for this particular choice lies in
the fact that, unlike soft law dealing with scope and application of the Treaty com-
petition rules,31 the justiciability of substantive soft law has largely32 not been
addressed in the jurisprudence of EU courts33 – a fact that entails a further inter-
pretative uncertainty for national courts. An exercise aiming at the delineation of
these instruments’ national judicial reception and possible legal effects, therefore,
is of significant added value. The final selection, thus, comprises the following
instruments: the Vertical Guidelines, the Horizontal Guidelines, the Article 81
(3) Guidelines (hereinafter, the 81(3) Guidelines), the Technology Transfer Guide-
lines and the Article 82 Guidance Paper (hereinafter, the Guidance Paper).34
30A list of all antitrust soft law can be found on the European Commission’s Competition
Antitrust Legislation web page <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/
legislation.html> accessed 20 September 2015. A combined overview of the first two Anti-
trust Handbooks available on the above web page (Compilations of EU Antitrust Legis-
lation Volumes 1and 2) gives a total number of 17 soft law instruments, out of which 7
deal with procedural issues, 3 with applicability/scope of the supranational competition pro-
visions and 5 are the selected notices for analysis in this study. The outstanding two are the
Leniency Notice and the Fining Notice, which are used at the supranational level only –
Member States issue their own guidance on these matters.
31The non-justiciability of a “scope” soft law instrument – the de minimis notice – has been
confirmed by the Court in its Expedia ruling (Case C-226/11, Expedia Inc. v Autorité de la
concurrence and Others [2012] ECR-General). On the other hand, “application” soft law –
such as the fining guidelines – has been held to be justiciable by the court in Case C-189/02
Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission [2005] ECR I-05425. On the concept of “jus-
ticiability” and its dependence on the establishment of legal force and/or legal effects, see
Stefan (n 12) 132.
32Only recently, in October 2015, did the judgment in Post Danmark II (Case C-23/14 Post
Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet [2015] NYR) confirm the non-justiciability of the 102
Guidance Paper.
33Idot (n 26) 115 and Vincent (n 5) 701. The situation as described by Idot and Vincent in
2008 and 2009, respectively, has not changed as of the end of 2015, except for the Post
Danmark II judgment (ibid).
34Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1; Communication from the Commis-
sion – Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1; Communication
from the Commission –Notice –Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty
[2004] OJ C 101/97; Communication from the Commission – Guidance on the Commis-
sion’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusion-
ary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7; Communication from the
Commission –Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union to technology transfer agreements [2014] OJ C89/03.































Because all the instruments analysed in this work are drafted supranationally,
they are essentially the same for all Member States; thus, the methodological com-
parative requirement for similarity in bases for comparison is fulfilled.35 However,
it should be kept in mind that Member States also issue national-level competition
soft law instruments, some of which closely reflect the supranational original.
When there is complete overlap in the substantive content of the supranational
instrument and its national counterpart, the rule of similarity in bases for compari-
son is not breached and the national equivalent also forms part of the basis for
comparison.36 What is excluded, however, are nationally drafted soft instruments
that do not substantively converge with the contents of supranational competition
soft law.37
A final methodological observation relates to the study’s data gathering
approach. The judicial decisions for empirical analysis were selected through a
search on national and EU case law databases.38 Search terms coincide with the
relevant (translated in the target language) titles of the soft law instruments
under study. For cases falling under the hypothesized “persuaded judiciary” scen-
ario, a sample of key terms specific to post-Modernization soft law vocabulary is
used as search terms.39 Where those terms are detected in national judgments, a
comparison between the wording used in the relevant guideline and that in the
35On the importance of the comparative base (tertium comparationis) being similar between
jurisdictions, see Orucu (n 25), 442–3, 448.
36Such is the case with the Dutch guidelines on Article 6(3) of the Dutch Competition Act.
They are a literal copy of the Commission 81(3) Guidelines – <https://zoek.
officielebekendmakingen.nl/stcrt-2005-47-p22-SC69176.html> accessed 26 April 2016.
37In the UK, despite the proliferation of administrative guidelines in the competition field,
none of those identified as relevant for this research (OFT 401, 402, 407, 415, 419, 953)
follows closely the texts of supranational soft instruments. This fact is also reflected in
an introductory statement usually included in those documents: “This guideline is not a sub-
stitute for the EC Treaty nor for regulations made under it. Neither is it a substitute for Euro-
pean Commission notices and guidelines.”
38The EU case law databases are the following: N-lex; JuriFast; Dec.Nat; Curia. For the
UK, the used databases are Bailii and Westlaw UK. For the Netherlands, those are
Kluwer and Rechtspraak. The cut-off date for data gathering is 1 October 2015.
39In order to create the sample of post-Modernization, soft-law specific terms, the method of
triangulation was used. In particular, the following sources were used to extract the necess-
ary terminology: the text of the soft law instruments forming part of this study, scholarly
articles analysing the respective instruments and signalling as to novel approaches and ter-
minology the latter may have adopted, and supranational judgments serving as a check to
the results generated by the first two sources. The search within the curia.eu database was
done with the terms generated through the cross-checking of the actual notices and scholarly
articles. If judgments were found that employed the extracted terms before the Moderniz-
ation process, the term was discounted because usage pre-Modernization signalled that it
was not unique to the Modernization period. The terms thus generated were: (for the Gui-
dance Paper) “equally efficient competitor (analysis)”, “LRAIC”, “AAC”, and “anti-com-
petitive foreclosure”; (for the 81(3) Guidelines) “consumer pass on” [in that word order];
































respective judgment will help identify whether the reference is indeed a disguised
reference to the contents of a Commission-issued competition soft instrument or
not.40 Finally, the hypothesized “rejection” and “neglect” scenarios can be
detected if courts fail to reason on soft-law-based arguments put forward by the
parties.41
Judicial recognition of Commission-issued soft instruments in the UK and
the Netherlands
Aggregate presentation of empirical observations
This section takes an empirical comparative look at the judicial handling of com-
petition claims involving Commission-issued competition soft law in the UK and
the Netherlands. As hypothesized in the Introduction, national judicial recognition
of supranational competition soft law can happen through several alternative
mechanisms, which are now (re)formulated as extended research hypotheses,
namely that:
. National courts can recognize soft law by either explicitly agreeing or dis-
agreeing with its substantive contents. This engagement can happen either
on the basis of general principles of law42 or, alternatively, on the basis of
hard law (legislation and case law) which soft instruments usually
“supplement”.43
. National courts can also recognize soft law if they are “persuaded” of its
value by endorsing its contents in a roundabout way – not explicitly
and “category management agreement”; (for the Horizontal Guidelines) “age of data”
(terms shared by guidelines) “qualitative efficiencies”.
40The reference detected in the national judgment could also reflect the wording of a CJEU/
CFI judgment that was, in its turn, summed up in supranational soft law. Where this is the
case, it will be explicitly acknowledged and reflected on.
41If courts avoid reasoning on the basis of soft law without voicing explicit rejection, the
theoretical model presupposes neglect – implicit rejection.
42Stefan (n 12) 200.
43ibid 141. To illustrate the point specifically for competition law, the Vertical Block
Exemption Regulation – VBER (Commission Regulation No 330/2010 [2010] OJ L 102/
01) – a hard law instrument – can give teeth to the Vertical Agreements Guidelines (n
34) – a soft law instrument. The same applies to the Horizontal Guidelines (n 34), which
are tied to the Block Exemption Regulations on Specialization and R&D Agreements
(Commission Regulation No 1218/2010 [2010] OJ L335/43 and Commission Regulation
No 1217/2010 [2010] OJ L 335/36). Also, the 81(3) Guidelines (n 34) apply as a general
“fall-back provision” to the more specific Horizontal Guidelines and as a “default” when
the VBER does not apply. Finally, the Technology Transfer Guidelines (n 34) are sup-
plementary to the Technology Transfer BER (Commission Regulation No 316/2014
[2014] OJ L 93/17) and the 102 Guidance Paper does not seem to be attached to any
hard law provision.































mentioning the instrument proper, but reaching a conclusion not inconsist-
ent with its provisions.44
. National courts can refuse to interpret soft law (rejection) or simply ignore
the instruments in question (neglect), both those attitudes signalling “refusal
(for recognition)”.
Within this theoretical framework, the empirical findings of the current study will
be addressed. A few remarks on the size of the sample, and the number and type of
references found are hereby in order.
The number of Dutch and UK public and private enforcement competition
cases that have engaged supranational soft law in the past 11 years is not stagger-
ing – 14 cases were identified per jurisdiction, amounting to a total of 28 cases.45
However, these low figures are not surprising when one compares them to the
competent national organs’ overall enforcement numbers on Article 101 and
102 matters during the period under examination (2004–2015).46 The number
of National Competition Authorities’ (NCA) decisions in the period 2004–
2010,47 which determines the amount of subsequent public enforcement
appeals, shows that the Dutch Competition Authority – ACM (with 76 cases)
and the UK Competition and Markets Authority – CMA (with 52 cases)48 lag
behind other top enforcers such as France and Germany. The latter two
44Schauer (n 15).
45For a listing of the cases detected, refer to Table A1 in the appendix.
46In the UK, the relevant judicial bodies (courts and tribunals) are: the Competition Appeals
Tribunal (CAT), the Court of Appeal of England and Wales (appellate instance to the CAT
by virtue of the Civil Procedural Rules 2004, s 30(8)), the Chancery Division of the High
Court of England and Wales, and the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (cassation
instance). For the Netherlands, the specialist courts are: the Rotterdam District Court (it
has a specialist division for competition appeals under Article 93 of the Dutch Competition
Act) and the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal (an appellate court of last instance on
economic matters pursuant to Title III Chapter I Article 18 of the DCA). Private enforce-
ment claims must be brought before civil courts.
47Rodger (n 1) 271. Aggregate information on Article 102 TFEU public investigations and
sanctions between 2005 and 2009, showing a similar distribution of NCA output (France
and Germany in the lead, with the UK and the Netherlands lagging behind) is available
in B Baarsma and R van der Noll, ‘Is Misbruik Machtspositie een Blinde Vlek in het Neder-
landse Mededingingstoezicht?’ (2013) 3 Tijdschrift Mededingingsrecht in de Praktijk
121–4.
48Out of these 52 decisions, 22 are infringement decisions according to figures presented by
RWhish, ‘The Role of the OFT in UK Competition Law’ in B Rodger (ed), Ten Years of UK
Competition Law Reform (Dundee University Press 2010) 1, 14. Out of these 22 infringe-
ments, 16 are cartel infringement decisions according to A Riley, ‘Outgrowing the Euro-
pean Administrative Model? Ten Years of British Anti-cartel Enforcement’ in B Rodger
(ed), Ten Years of UK Competition Law Reform (Dundee University Press 2010) 257,
261. In this sense, although the latter author argues that cartel infringement decisions
over the period 1998–2008 are relatively few, they actually constitute more than ¾ of all
































jurisdictions have issued, respectively, 189 and 128 decisions for the same
period.49 Adding to the above numbers the output of the ACM and CMA in the
period 2010–2015, the overall figures are summed up to 105 decisions for the
Dutch authority and 83 for its UK counterpart,50 both of which are comparatively
low numbers. Therefore, it is no surprise that public judicial enforcement figures
for the UK show that only 56 cases (in 91 judgments) have been rendered in the
relevant period by the Competition Appeals Tribunal (CAT)51 and a total of 34
cases (in 39 judgments) by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court taken
together.52 Private enforcement numbers according to Rodger are not high
either – in the period 2004–2012 he identifies 85 judgments (both stand-alone
and follow-on), out of which more than half (44) are follow-on actions at the
CAT.53 Lower stand-alone claims numbers are explained by the author through
the so-called “hidden story” of settlements, which, according to Rodger, means
that the observable stand-alone litigation practice forms only “the tip of the
iceberg”.54
In comparison to UK judicial output, the Netherlands appears to have a better
track record, especially when it comes to private enforcement, which more than
compensates the lower public enforcement figures. According to Rodger,55 in
the period 2004–2012, the total number of follow-on and stand-alone private com-
petition actions has been 217, with a steady average of circa 20 cases per year.
When it comes to public enforcement, the Rotterdam District Court has issued a
total of 41 judgments in competition matters (21 of which on the basis of the
Dutch Competition Act – hereinafter DCA),56 while the highest appellate instance
– the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal has decided 38 cases (out of which 25
under the DCA).57 As stated above, these low public enforcement numbers were
49The amount of files processed by the authorities is, of course, much higher. For example,
Plomp testifies that more than 6000 files (cases) have been processed by the Dutch Com-
petition Authority (ACM) between 1998 and 2009. MJ Plomp, Praktijkboek Mededingings-
recht (Uitgeverij Den Hollander 2009) ch 6.
50A search on the ACMwebsite as per 20 January 2016 shows that 29 more cartel and abuse
of dominance decisions have been taken in the past 5 years, which is actually a drop in the
per annum activity of the ACM. A search on the CMA website as per 20 January 2016
shows that 31 more cases have been closed under the Competition Act 1998 since 2011,
which would mean that the per annum enforcement has significantly increased in the
past five years.
51Search through the CAT database.
52Search on Westlaw UK.
53Rodger (n 1) 77, 102–3. However, the author testifies that “anecdotal evidence form prac-
titioners indicates that there has been a considerable increase in competition claims raised at
the High Court in recent years”. ibid 31. Search done through the CAT database.
54Rodger (n 1), 59.
55ibid 99.
56The figures are confirmed by searches both on Kluwer and Rechtspraak.
57The figures were generated through Rechtspraak. For a confirmation of the relatively low
enforcement figures, see M van Oers, ‘De NMa zal Handhaven’ in P Kalfbleisch and others































expected on the basis of the relatively small amount of ACM sanctioning decisions
(excluding those in a building sector cartel that unfolded in the spring of 2004).
Indeed, it needs to be observed that a great amount of the resources of the
Dutch enforcer in the period after 2004 were dedicated to work on one single
but significant infringement – a huge cartel in the building sector.58
When it comes to the observed soft law references per instrument, some of the
cases identified mention more than one relevant instrument, which is why the total
number of references to selected soft law [33] exceeds the total number of cases
[28]. One-third of those 33 references [11] are directed towards the Vertical Guide-
lines, while the outstanding 22 are almost evenly split between the 81(3) Guidelines
[6], the Horizontal Guidelines [7] and the Guidance Paper [7]; the number of refer-
ences to the Technology Transfer Guidelines is very low – 1 per jurisdiction [2].59
If one looks at references per country, a gap can only be noticed in the number
of judicial references to the Guidance Paper. While Dutch courts refer to the instru-
ment five times in five separate judgments, UK courts engage with the Guidance
Paper just twice in two separate judgments. However, both numbers are quite
small to enable a meaningful conclusion as to whether there is a quantitative
cross-jurisdictional disparity in treatment of Article 102 TFEU cases mentioning
the Guidance Paper.60 The latter low numbers could be owing to the fact that
the substance of the Guidance Paper significantly deviates from supranational
case law on abuse of dominant position.61 This dissonance also prompts the
specific denomination of the Guidance Paper62 – that of “enforcement priorities”
(eds), Trust en Antitrust: Beschouwingen over 10 jaar Mw en 10 jaar NMa (Redactiebureau
Editor 2008). For information on the builders’ cartel, refer to pages 246–7. For the latter, see
also E Sakkers, ‘Rechtshandhaving van het Kartelverbod: Zoek de Verschillen’ in P Kalf-
bleisch and others (eds), Trust en Antitrust: Beschouwingen over 10 jaar Mw en 10 jaar
NMa (Redactiebureau Editor 2008) 92–3 and Plomp (n 49) ch 6.
58A perusal of the annual summaries of ACM’s activity, published in the journal Mededin-
gingsrecht in de Praktijk, shows that since 2005 there has been a relatively high number of
sanctioning decisions taken in relation to the builder’s cartel. See Issues 1 of the years
2006–2009.
59This could be due to the fact that, as Justice Birss argues in the UK Unwired Planet judg-
ment (Unwired Planet International Limited v Huawei Technologies Co. Limited, [2015]
EWHC 2097 (Pat), [48]), the inter-relationship between competition law and IP forms
quite a specific field of knowledge/law, especially when it comes to the intersection of
FRAND obligations and competition law.
60For explanations for the low amount of Article 102 TFEU judgments/decisions, refer to B
Rodger and A MacCulloch, Competition Law and Policy in the EU and the UK (Routledge
2015) 75, 130, 135–6 and Rodger (n 1) 139. See also Whish (n 50) 170.
61L Gormsen, ‘Why the European Commission’s Enforcement Priorities on Article 82 EC
Should Be Withdrawn?’ (2010) 31 European Competition Law Review 45–51 and J Killick
and A Komninos, ‘AMissed Opportunity: Why the Guidance Paper Does Not Increase Pre-
dictability or Advance the Debate’ (2009) 2 Concurrences Review 23–6.
62GMonti, ‘Article 82 EC: What Future for the Effects-Based Approach?’ (2010) 1 Journal
































informing the Commission’s future case selection practice – rather than the orig-
inally envisioned “substantive guidelines” reflecting the law in the area.63 In that
sense, the function of the Guidance Paper cannot be equated with that of other sub-
stantive soft law. Still, some authors opine that the Guidance Paper actually con-
tains principles that aim at changing the law (the concept of abuse)64 and is thus
not that different from substantive guidelines.65 Others believe that the Guidance
Paper is precisely what it claims to be – an enforcement priorities document.66 In
that sense, national judicial refusal for recognition of this instrument may well be
higher due to the Guidance Paper’s indeterminate status and function. However, it
may also happen that “given the paucity of private enforcement and the pressures
NCAs will be under to follow the Commission’s enforcement stance, the Commis-
sion’s practice will mean that in time the new enforcement standards will become
concepts of abuse”.67 This work will aim at providing an answer as to which of the
described attitudes prevails in national courts.
In order to perform a reliable comparison between the two chosen jurisdictions
that also reflects the hypotheses enumerated in the beginning of this section, the
detected attitudes to competition soft law of the Dutch and UK judiciaries are
going to be comparatively analysed under the headings “Recognition” (with
sub-parts “Explicit agreement/disagreement” and “Persuasion”), and “Refusal
for Recognition” (with sub-parts “Explicit rejection” and “Neglect”). A final
heading “Other Types of Recognition” will encompass results that could not be
subsumed under the above-listed headings. For purposes of textual coherence,
cases most illustrative of each trend will be discussed in detail, while the rest of
the empirical material will be touched upon more briefly.
National judicial approaches to supranational competition soft law
Recognition – explicit agreement or disagreement
This section is going to discuss cases where the Dutch and UK judiciary seem to
explicitly engage with soft law instruments. The majority of explicit agreement/
disagreement instances happened on the basis of soft law, read together with
63The original intent of the Commission to publish guidelines on the enforcement of Article
102 is discussed by Gormsen (n 61), 46 and in LF Pace, ‘The Italian Way of Tackling the
Abuse of a Dominant Position and the Inconsistences of the Commission’s Guidance: Not a
Notice but a Communication’, in LF Pace (ed), European Competition Law: The Impact of
the Commission’s Guidance on Article 102 (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011), 104–5.
64Monti (n 62) and Sinclair (n 23). Greene (n 10) 779–80 also notes that an implicit role of
guidelines in the US antitrust context is “commentary on the law”, their explicit (express)
role being explanation of the reasoning and analysis underlying agency exercise of prose-
cutorial discretion.
65Gormsen (n 61).
66RWhish, ‘Intel v Commission: Keep Calm and Carry On!’ (2015) 6 Journal of European
Competition Law and Practice 1, 2.
67Monti (n 62) 5.































hard law. Explicit soft law-based reasoning through the intermediation of general
principles of law was not detected. However, in both jurisdictions there appears to
be an implicit working of the supranational principle of consistent interpretation
reflected in EU competition law by Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003,68 which
also seems to have its respective national competition-law-specific counterparts
in the two systems under study.69 Instances in which courts explicitly disagreed
with the contents of guidelines were not detected as such, but a case of implicit
disagreement that was not previously hypothesized did arise at the level of the Rot-
terdam District Court.
A prime example of explicit agreement with soft law is the UK IMS v OFT
case,70 where the 81.3 Guidelines and the Vertical Guidelines were at issue
before the CAT.71 This case dealt with an exclusive purchasing contract
between the British broadcaster Channel 4 and BBC Broadcast (BBCB). Under
the contract’s terms, BBCB undertook to supply Channel 4 with broadcasting
access services in the form of, among others, subtitling and sign language. At
the time of signing, the exclusive agreement fell under the protective ambit of
the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (VBER).72 However, subsequent devel-
opments increased BBCB’s market share, to the effect that, for a significant part of
its duration, the contract fell out of the VBER’s safe harbours, making the agree-
ment vulnerable to a challenge under competition law. Under these circumstances,
IMS, a competitor of BBCB, complained to the regulator (Ofcom) that the exclu-
sivity term in the agreement infringed both the prohibitions on abuse of dominance
(Chapter 2) and anti-competitive agreements (Chapter 1)73 of the UK Competition
Act 1998 (hereinafter CA ‘98).74 IMS’s complaint was reviewed by Ofcom, which
decided there were no grounds for action on either of the allegations made. Unsa-
tisfied with the decision, IMS appealed to the CAT. Only certain fragments of the
Chapter 1 claim are material to this study.
The judgment begins by setting out a framework of the applicable law, includ-
ing both the primary domestic and EU competition provisions, and soft law rel-
evant to the assessment of the dispute – the 81(3) and the Vertical Guidelines.
Importantly, what is also mentioned is section 60(3) of the CA ‘98 according to
which, in its deliberations under national competition law, the Tribunal must
“have regard to any relevant decision or statement of the [European]
68The principle of consistent interpretation is expressed in Article 4(3) TEU, and is in turn
reflected in the contents of Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003 (n 2).
69For the Netherlands, Article 1 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Dutch Competition
Act (Kamerstukken II 1995/96, 24707). For the UK, Competition Act 1998, s. 60.
70Independent Media Support Ltd v Office of Communications, [2008] CAT 13.
71The 81(3) Guidelines were also incidentally discussed in this case.
72Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (n 34).
73The Chapter 1 and 2 prohibitions are the UK national equivalents of the Article 101 and
102 TFEU prohibitions.
































Commission”.75 The word “statement” is understood to refer to Commission-
issued notices and communications.76
The main function of s.60 as a whole is to make UK enforcers apply EU law to
purely domestic situations – this is alsowhy it is called by authors the “absolute obli-
gation to apply EU law” provision.77 Although IMS is not a purely domestic case,
and therefore the supranational consistency obligation of Regulation 1/2003
applies,78 the national equivalent – the s.60(3) obligation – is nevertheless men-
tioned by the CAT. This “repetition”, also observed in other judgments, allows
this author to stipulate that the role of s.60, and more specifically of s.60(3),
extends beyond approximation of purely national cases with EU law. Namely, in
cases where cross-border effect is established, s.60(3), by being more specific
than Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003 in its reference to particular supranational
(soft) instruments, has a second function of grounding national reasoning based
on supranational soft law without the need for further judicial elaboration.79 This
point will be taken up again further in this section and backed up with examples.
Moving to the analytical part of the judgment,80 IMS alleges an error of assess-
ment in Ofcom’s holding that the challenged agreement does not fall under the
Chapter 1 prohibition.81 One of the particular objections mounted by IMS is that, in
its assessment of the market structure for the purposes of establishing a possible
breach underChapter 1,Ofcomhad simply recycled its earlier analysis of the competi-
tive situation for the purposes of assessing dominance under Chapter 2. The CAT
accepts IMS’s concerns on the basis that: “There is an important difference between
the degree of market power required for the purposes of Articles 81 and 82.”82 To
support this observation, the court cites a relevant passage of the 81(3) Guidelines,
The degree of market power normally required for the finding of an infringement
under Article 81(1) in the case of agreements that are restrictive of competition by
effect is less than the degree of market power required for a finding of dominance
under Article 82.83
75Competition Act 1998, s.60 (3).
76R Whish and D Bailey, Competition Law (6th edn, OUP 2009) 366.
77M Furse, Competition Law of the EC and UK (6th edn, OUP 2008) 57.
78Art.3.of Regulation 1/2003 (n 2).
79A similar idea is expressed in Sarmiento (n 5), 272.
80[2008] CAT 13 (n 70) [100]–[124].
81ibid [84].
82ibid [115].
83ibid [26], which states:
The degree of market power normally required for the finding of an infringement
under Article 81(1) in the case of agreements that are restrictive of competition by
effect is less than the degree of market power required for a finding of dominance
under Article 82.































The CAT then proceeds with its own assessment of the market structure, which in
the end leads it to the conclusion that no competitive concerns exist.
In this instance, the court was not prompted to use soft law either by the parties’
arguments or by Ofcom’s decision under appeal.84 Therefore, it could be concluded
that this is an instance of an explicit (own initiative) engagement and agreement
with the content of a supranational competition soft instrument – namely, the
81.3 Guidelines. This (spontaneous) recognition without further elaboration on
the mechanics of judicial reliance on soft law could be explained by (a) the interme-
diating force of s.60(3) of the ‘CA98 as stipulated above and (b) by the pertinence of
the said guidelines to the legislative supranational Block Exemption Regulations.85
A similar explanation could be given to account for the CAT’s judicial engage-
ment with the Vertical Guidelines as an answer to the last claim made by the plain-
tiff.86 In suggesting how Ofcom should have performed the anti-competitive
analysis under Chapter 1/Article 101 TFEU, IMS bases itself on the Vertical
Guidelines,87 and case law – the Neste case88 – to argue that “the Channel 4 Con-
tract not only fell within Article 81(1), but was incapable of satisfying the criteria
set out in Article 81(3)”.89 In particular, the plaintiff puts forward the formalistic
argument that the duration of the non-compete obligation in the contract in ques-
tion, given the market power of its parties, is in itself sufficient to engage the
Chapter 1 prohibition. In response, the court turns the argument of the plaintiff
on its head, asserting incorrect reading of both the case law and the pertinent Ver-
tical Guidelines, which do not suggest formalistic, but flexible interpretation of all
the circumstances surrounding a given contract,
It is apparent from paragraph 62 of the Vertical Restraints Guidelines that there is no
presumption that a vertical agreement which falls outside the Vertical Agreements
Block Exemption will fall within the prohibition in Article 81(1): the agreement
will need to be assessed on the particular circumstances of the case […]90
This judicial engagement instance shows that so long as the Vertical Guidelines are
in line with hard law – in this case – case law, the judiciary has no problem invok-
ing them and agreeing with (recognizing) their content.
84The decision can be found at <http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/enforcement/
competition-bulletins/closed-cases/all-closed-cases/cw_842/c4.pdf> accessed 20 January
2016.
85The 81(3) guidelines, unlike the Horizontal, Vertical and Technology Transfer Guidelines,
are not directly related to a Block Exemption Regulation. For their connection to the legis-
lative framework of competition law, refer to FrankWijckmans and Filip Tuytschaever, Ver-
tical Agreements in EU Competition Law (OUP 2011).
86[2008] CAT 13 (n 70) [120]–[124].
87ibid [141], [145].
88C-214/99 Neste Markkinointi Oy v Yötuuli Ky and Others [2000] ECR I-11121.

































Further empirical observations from both jurisdictions under study91 confirm
that the above assertion is valid for the Vertical Guidelines, also when they are
interpreted together with relevant Commission decisions and secondary EU law
– namely, the VBER.92 The Horizontal93 and Technology Transfer Guidelines94
also (but less frequently) get endorsed by courts when they support pertinent
supranational hard law. The reason for these empirical results has been addressed
by several authors95 writing about soft law reception in supranational courts. As
Stefan testifies, the EU competition domain is defined by a hybridity of (legal
and non-legal) instruments the Commission issues, whereby “soft law adds
further precision to the general rules provided for in the Treaty, regulations and
directives, thus specifying and concretizing the law”.96 By means of empirical
examples, Stefan shows that this hybridity is also acknowledged by EU Courts,
which, after checking whether the provisions of soft law remain within the bound-
aries set by hard law, interpret and engage both types of instruments together, “the
principles of normative interpretation cut along the hierarchy of legal norms,
showing the integration between soft and hard law in a hybrid regulatory
system”.97 As it seems, the same principle holds in national courts.
When it comes to the 81(3) Guidelines, one way for them to get endorsed judi-
cially in UK courts is through the intermediation of s.60(3) ‘CA 98 as exemplified
above. An example from the Netherlands shows that recognition of those guide-
lines also happens through interpretation together with hard law as attested by
the Modint judgment,98 where the 81(3) Guidelines were included in an in-text
citation, together with several supranational judgments relevant to the matter at
hand.99 The “case-law-read-together-with-soft-law” approach of the court
served to emphasize the point that an object restriction should be established
91Hof Amsterdam 26 juni 2012, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2012:BX0258, [2.14]; Conclusie Hoge
Raad 02 oktober 2009, ECLI:NL:PHR:2009:BJ9439, [2.36]; Conclusie Hoge Raad 21
december 2012, ECLI:NL:PHR:2012:BX9019, [20].
92[2006] EWHC 1241 (Ch), [254]. For the Netherlands, see Conclusie Hoge Raad 15 april
2011, ECLI:NL:PHR:2011:BQ2213, [2.42]. For the UK, see [2011] EWHC 3165 (Ch),
[71].
93The Horizontal Guidelines (n 34) are usually interpreted together with the BERs on R&D
and specialization agreements. An example of such a judicial engagement is the UK judg-
ment Sel-Imperial Limited v The British Standards Institution [2010] EWHC 854 (Ch),
[167]. For the Netherlands, see Hof’s-Gravenhage 05 mai 2008, ECLI:NL:
GHSGR:2008:BD3247, [13]–[14]; see also College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven
28 oktober 2005, ECLI:NL:CBB:2005:AU5316.
94For the Netherlands, Rechtbank den Haag 3 Juni 2015, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:6346.
For the UK, see Unwired Planet (n 59) [31].
95Stefan (n 12) 141. The same thesis is also expressed by Sarmiento (n 5) 267–71.
96Stefan (n 12) 141.
97ibid.
98College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven 28 oktober 2005, ECLI:NL:CBB:2005:
AU5316.
99ibid [7.2.2].































through a careful analysis of, inter alia, the economic context in which the agree-
ment takes place. Similar judicial treatment of those guidelines can also be
detected in UK courts.100
With regard to the Guidance Paper, the fact that it deviates from current
supranational case law to a significant extent does not contribute to a positive
national judicial engagement with its contents.101 Still, in instances where the
said instrument can be interpreted in harmony with existing supranational pre-
cedent, courts do not shy away from doing so. Such was the situation in the
Dutch NVM v HPC case.102 The judgment dealt with, inter alia, a refusal to
supply claim under Article 24 DCA (the Dutch counterpart of Article 102
TFEU). The plaintiff at first instance (HPC’s curator) complained that the domi-
nant undertaking (NVM) delayed sharing interoperability information with its
downstream competitor HPC, which, as a direct consequence thereof, was
forced to exit the market. In its judgment, the Regional Court of Amsterdam
employs the Guidance Paper in order to establish the applicable EU framework
for analysis of refusal to deal cases.103 After explaining the main assessment cri-
teria contained in several CJEU/GC refusal to deal judgments,104 the court refers
to the Guidance Paper in order to explain the meaning of the term “constructive
refusal”, also of importance for the assessment. The term had been used before
in the Commission decisional practice and case law.105 Therefore, here we can
again speak of reference to the content of soft law on the basis of/together
with existing hard law. The same type of engagement with the Guidance
Paper can also be found in the NVM v HPC Opinion of AG Keus at the
Supreme Court.106
Another – and very different – type of judicial treatment of the Guidance Paper
is exhibited by a judgment of the Rotterdam District Court. In Sandd BV,107 the
plaintiffs (Sandd) allege several anti-competitive activities performed by TNT
(now PostNL) in the period before the full liberalization of the Dutch postal ser-
vices market (pre-2009). The relevant allegations relate to predatory pricing on the
100For an engagement with the 81(3) Guidelines together with pertinent case law in the UK,
see The Racehorse Association and Others v OFT and The British Horseracing Board v
OFT [2005] CAT 29 [2005] CAT 29, [153]; Bookmakers’ Greyhound Amalgamated Ser-
vices et al. v Amalgamated Racing Ltd et al [2008] EWHC 1978, [310], [327]–[341],
[438]; Cityhook Ltd v OFT [2007] CAT 18, [268]–[295].
101Scholars that argue this point are Gormsen (n 61) and Pinar Akman, The Concept of
Abuse in EU Competition Law (Hart Publishing 2012).
102Hof Amsterdam 12 juni 2012, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2012:BX0460 and Hoge Raad 24
januari 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:149.
103Hof Amsterdam 12 juni 2012, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2012:BX0460, [2.27].
104ibid.
105Deutsche Post AG [2001] OJ L 331/40, recital 141. C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v Telia-
Sonera AB [2010] ECR I-00527, Opinion of AG Mazak.
106HR 24 januari 2014, ECLI:NL:PHR:2013:1108 (concl. A-G Keus), [3.13].
































market for non-priority (non-urgent) mailing.108 The question that has to be deter-
mined is whether the Dutch ACM was correct to rely on LRAIC (Long-Run
Average Incremental Cost) as the correct cost benchmark in order to conclude
there could be no suspicion of predatory pricing practised by the defendant. The
plaintiffs’ complaint is that the LRAIC benchmark cannot be the correct
measure because it assumes that there exists an equally efficient competitor on
the market, which was not the case. The judge dismisses this argument by
stating that the “as efficient competitor” benchmark is the correct one because
otherwise, “a less efficient competitor could force a dominant undertaking to
increase its prices, precisely because the former is less efficient, which, in the
end, is to the detriment of consumers”.109 A citation to the Post Danmark I
case follows where it was stated that the goal of Article 102 TFEU is not to
allow less efficient competitors than the dominant one to stay on the market.110
Therefore, basing itself on (the supremacy of) supranational case law, the court
indirectly dismisses/disagrees with the content of paragraph 24 of the Guidance
Paper, which states that “the Commission recognizes that in certain circumstances
a less efficient competitor may also exert a constraint which should be taken into
account when considering whether particular price-based conduct leads to anti-
competitive foreclosure”.
In this sense, one can speak of a non-verbalized, but extant disagreement with
a part of the Guidance Paper that is not supported in case law. Paragraph 24 of the
Guidance Paper is in fact much disputed in literature and, besides not being in line
with case law, is argued to be adding unnecessary confusion to the already com-
plicated concept of anti-competitive foreclosure.111 In the second part of the fol-
lowing sub-section, the Guidance Paper will again be touched upon, but this
time with regard to a judicial attitude of explicit rejection.
Refusal for recognition – explicit rejection
A case illustrative of the explicit rejection hypothesis is the UK Court of Appeal
decision in BAGS.112 The soft law that came under fire were the Horizontal Guide-
lines. The appellant in that case – BAGS – is an organization promoting the inter-
ests of bookmakers operating in Licensed Betting Offices (LBOs). In particular, it
acquires the media rights of UK racecourses for the purposes of televising horse-
racing competitions in LBOs. The complaint of BAGS was against the sale of
media rights by a group of 30 UK racecourses (known as the “RUK racecourses”)
108ibid [9.2].
109ibid [9.2.4].
110C-209/10 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet [2012] ECR-General.
111Akman (n 101).
112Bookmakers’ Greyhound Amalgamated Services et al. v Amalgamated Racing Ltd et al
[2008] EWHC 1978 (Ch), [2008] EWHC 2688 (Ch) and – on appeal – [2009] EWCA Civ
750.































to AMRAC – a potential competitor. Importantly, the sale was made in order to
sponsor entry into a monopsonistic market (created by BAGS’ activities) of
AMRAC’s business that was to act in direct competition to BAGS. The claim
of BAGS relevant for this discussion is the allegation that prior to the sale,
there had been horizontal negotiation and subsequent concerted collective
action between the RUK racecourses for the sale of their rights to AMRAC.
This negotiation, according to BAGS, had an anti-competitive object. In particu-
lar, BAGS argued that, since the RUK courses were in competition with each other
with regard to the prices and terms of the individual licenses they could have
secured with AMRAC, the collective negotiation thereof was restrictive by object.
In response to the latter claim, counsel for the opposing parties (AMRAC/RUK)
based his reasoning – solely – on paragraph 24 of the 2001 Horizontal Guidelines.
This paragraph provides thatwhen undertakings agree to join forces in order to carry
out an activity that they cannot single-handedly pull off, that activity does not imply
a coordination of the parties’ competitive behaviours on the market and it cannot
therefore have the object or effect of restricting competition. On that point, the
judge ruled as follows, “I see a good deal of force in that proposition, but I prefer
not to decide this case on that basis.”113 No further elaboration on the reasons for
this conclusion followed, but it is evident that, in order to decide whether or not
there was an infringement by object, the court explicitly preferred to steer away
from a party’s argument based solely on soft law. This judicial choice is not surpris-
ing if one considers an argumentmade byBorchardt andWellensmore than 20 years
ago – namely, that if courts use soft law in the ratio decidendi of a judgment, they
convert it into hard law.114 Instead, the judge reached the conclusion that no anti-
competitive object could be established by endorsing opposing counsel’s
(logical) reasoning that “there cannot be an agreement whose object (or for that
matter whose effect) is to restrict competition if at the relevant time there is no com-
petition to be restricted”.115 In that sense, the judge held, “arrangements whose
object was to enable [an undertaking] to enter the market could not therefore be
restrictive of competition that did not and could not exist at the time”.116
Another instance of judicial rejection, but with regard to the Guidance Paper, is
the Purple Parking v Heathrow Airport case,117 decided by the UK High Court.118
113ibid [2009] EWCA Civ 750 (CA) (n 112) [91].
114G Borchardt and K Wellens, ‘Soft Law in European Community Law’ (1989) 14 Euro-
pean Law Review 267, 271.
115[2009] EWCA Civ 750 (CA) (n 112) [92].
116ibid.
117Purple Parking Ltd, Meteor Parking Ltd v Heathrow Airport Ltd [2011] EWHC 987
(Ch).
118Rodger and MacCulloch (n 60) 137 argue that Purple Parking is one of the three most
significant UK abuse of dominance cases. The other two are Attheraces Ltd v British Horse-
racing Board [2005] EWHC 3015 (Ch) and Arriva the Shires Ltd v London Luton Airport
































There, the operator and owner of Heathrow Airport (HAL) was held to have
abused a dominant position by changing existing arrangements with the intent
to exclude competing “meet and greet” operators (Purple Parking, Meteor
Parking) from airport terminal forecourts, thus promoting its own and equivalent
services. The Guidance Paper119 was used by HAL’s lawyers to support a claim
that a foreclosure (abuse) under Article 102 TFEU could only be established by
the plaintiffs (Purple, Meteor) if, among others, the latter succeeded in proving
elimination of (effective) competition. Purple countered that it was sufficient to
show that competition was hindered rather than eliminated. The judge, siding
with the plaintiffs, refuted one-by-one the case-law-based arguments in favour
of an “elimination” threshold put forward by HAL.120 Along with those, the invo-
cation of the Guidance Paper was also rejected as irrelevant. The judge dismissed
the entire instrument with the following motivation,
[…] as the document itself points in paragraph 3, it is not a statement of the law, and
paragraph 81 makes it clear that what is being referred to is an enforcement priority,
not a definition of abuse. I do not think that this document assists the debate.121
This reasoning shows that the judge does not consider the Guidance Paper as a
source for interpretation of the law, but as a mere instrument citing enforcement
priorities that have no relevance for legal interpretation. If that reasoning is fol-
lowed, even in passages where the Guidance Paper does reflect existing (case)
law, it will be disregarded in judicial reasoning because it is not an instrument rel-
evant to legal interpretation.
Before concluding this sub-section, it needs to be observed that the two
instances of judicial rejection described here are very different. In the former
case, the Horizontal Guidelines were invoked as the sole supporting instrument
for a claim made by a party to the dispute. If, as argued above, the judge had
decided the matter relying solely on soft law (use of soft law as ratio decidendi),
that would have amounted to endowing soft law with binding force. This is why, it
is argued, rejection ensued.122 By contrast, in the latter case, the Guidance Paper
was used as support to case law – an instance in which substantive soft law usually
gets judicial recognition as observed in the previous sub-section. However, the
119Guidance Paper (n 34) [81] read together with [75].
120The case law relied on by HAL was in the realm of essential facilities, which is not appli-
cable to the fact set of the current case.
121[2011] EWHC 987 (Ch) (n 117) [95].
122ibid [101] and [117] support this conclusion. In those paragraphs, the horizontal guide-
lines are mentioned in support of arguments that are based on case law (soft law read
together with hard law). Also, the same paragraph was quoted by the CAT in a case with
a similar fact set (The Racehorse Association and Others v OFT and The British Horsera-
cing Board v OFT [2005] CAT 29) as part of the legal framework enunciating rules that
were not disputed by the parties. In that context, the Tribunal did not have a problem
quoting soft law.































response here was rejection due to – in the judge’s words – the fact that the soft
instrument was not a statement of the law. Therefore, the status of “enforcement
priorities” of the Guidance Paper incited the judge to reject the possibility that
the instrument produces legal effects through interpretation together with relevant
hard law. It is also possible (although no direct indication for that conclusion was
found in the judicial text) that the court actually rejected the Guidance Paper
because it is a controversial text that is perceived123 as proposing an alternative
reading of existing Article 102 case law.124
Refusal for recognition – neglect
In a cartel “hub-and-spoke” collusion scenario that occurred in the UK,125 the
Horizontal Guidelines and their renewed information exchange section in particu-
lar,126 were invoked by the plaintiff Tesco only to be ignored by the judiciary in its
reasoning.
In 2011, the CMA issued a Chapter 1 infringement decision to several dairy
producers and major UK supermarkets (Tesco and others) with regard to collusive
price increases of dairy products for end consumers. Tesco appealed to the CAT
against the decision establishing that it had participated in exchange of future
retail prices for British-produced cheddar and other territorial cheeses. The
CAT, when establishing the relevant legal framework for assessment,127 discusses
the argument put forward by Tesco’s lawyer that the information on competitor’s
pricing its client received through a supplier constituted aggregated (as opposed to
individualized) data that could moreover not be trusted as being reliable. While the
trustworthiness argument is dismissed, the distinction aggregate-individualized
data, argued on the basis of the Horizontal Guidelines128 together with the national
convergence obligation in s. 60(3) CA ‘98, is acknowledged by the CAT as a rel-
evant consideration in the assessment of anti-competitiveness. The judge,
however, rephrases the relevant passages of the Horizontal Guidelines and re-
cites them as if they are coming from the court, “In our judgment, the exchange
of individualized data is more likely to facilitate coordination because it makes
it easier for companies to reach a common understanding regarding future
123See Gormsen (n 61) and Akman (n 101).
124The Guidance Paper received a subtler, yet similar treatment by the Court of Appeal in
National Grid v GEMA [2010] EWCA Civ 114, [53], [54], [57]. The relevant discussion
there was on the value of counterfactuals and what the Guidance Paper had to say in that
regard seemed to not be appreciated.
125Tesco Stores Ltd, Tesco Holdings Ltd, Tesco Plc v Office of Fair Trading [2012] CAT 31.
126In the newest version of the guidelines – that of 2011, the section on information
exchange is significantly expanded in comparison to the old version of the same soft law
instrument.
127[2012] CAT 31 supra n 130 [44]–[87].
































prices or sales.”129 The court does not give any authority to underpin this state-
ment, so it could be that counsel’s invocation of the guidelines accompanied by
the s.60(3) consistency obligation provides for explicit judicial recognition of a
rule expressed in the soft instrument. One should keep in mind, however, that
the above statement is made in the “applicable law” section of the judgment
where no actual analysis on the matter(s) at hand is yet present. The CAT also
promises that it would take account of the distinction between individualized
and aggregate data in the analytical part of the judgment.130 Although the Tribunal
seems to do so,131 the discussion on the matter is not explicit132 and the Horizontal
Guidelines put forward by defendant’s counsel are not mentioned anymore.
At a first glance, the above-described judicial handling of soft law could be
signalling recognition on the basis of s.60(3). However, the latter principle was
invoked by defendant’s counsel, not the CAT. By contrast, judges who endorse
supranational soft law on the basis of s.60(3) explicitly emphasize the relevance
of that provision. Furthermore, the Tribunal re-stated passages of the Horizontal
Guidelines on its own authority – although this might look like recognition, the
instrument is not followed up on in the analytical part, which would imply that
the court was manoeuvring its way out of a direct, concrete discussion on the
basis of the guidelines. This is not unthinkable if one considers the consequences
which the court chooses to attach to s.60 of the CA ‘98 when discussing the pro-
vision at the very beginning of the judgment, under the heading “Statutory Frame-
work”. For the CAT, s.60 “of course includes ensuring consistency with the
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice and General Court of the European
Union”.133 The court mentions nothing on having regard to statements or
decisions of the Commission, however; this is done by TESCO’s counsel, but
not taken up by the CAT.
On the basis of these considerations, it could be concluded that this might
well be a case of neglect of a supranational soft law instrument – although it
was explicitly invoked by counsel, the court chose not to say anything on the
matter in the analytical part of the judgment. Why were the Horizontal Guide-
lines neglected at this instance? It could be because the distinction aggregate-
individualized data exchange was only introduced with the 2011 version of
the Horizontal Guidelines and supranational case law on the matter before






134A search on curia.eu points to one case discussing the matter having been decided pre-
2011: Joined cases T-305/94P Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij et al.v Commission of the
European Communities 1999] ECR II-00931.
































As established in the methodological section above, cases falling under a “per-
suaded judiciary” scenario were to be found by a specific key term search,
which, however, turned out to detect judgments that contained explicit references
to soft law only (the specific key terms located judgments that were already in the
sample by means of the initial key terms search). In this sense, not even one of the
judgments found can be argued to exemplify a pure persuasion instance. However,
the Dutch Nestlé v Mars case comes close to the ideal persuasion scenario that was
envisioned theoretically.135
The claim relevant for this discussion, mounted by Nestlé before the Dis-
trict Court of East Brabant, is a complaint against an anti-competitive rebate
scheme (the MOP 2011) operated by Mars on the premises of Dutch gas
stations. The scheme (for chocolate products distribution) consists in granting
discounts and bonuses to gas stations that arrange their shelf space according
to the conditions set by Mars. The fulfilment of those conditions results in allo-
cation of considerable gas-station space to Mars products. On top of this, gas
stations have to install specific additional displays for Mars products only.
Nestlé submits that this behaviour of Mars can be seen as an abuse of domi-
nant position (Article 24 DCA) or, in the alternative, that Mars’s contracts with
Dutch gas stations constitute anti-competitive agreements in the sense of
Article 6 DCA. In the framework of Article 24 DCA, Nestlé submits that
the arrangements of Mars have a considerable market foreclosure effect –
the discounts are percentage-based (a percentage of the yearly tank station’s
turnover on Mars products), whereby a leveraging effect is created between
Mars must-stock products and additional purchases subject to a possible dis-
count. Nestlé also submits that, because of the leveraging effects that Mars
profits from, an equally efficient competitor cannot rival its discounts
without suffering significant losses.
In these factual circumstances, when discussing the applicable law, the judge
mentions that the case will be decided on the basis of national competition law
only, but, in line with Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003, guidance will also be
sought in the relevant European legal sources – judgments of the CJEU, “and
the assessment guides that the European Commission has issued with regard to
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU”.136 In the footnote to this statement, it becomes
clear that the court has the Guidance Paper and the Vertical Guidelines in mind
when using the formulation “assessment guides” – an approach reminiscent to
that of the UK judiciary under s.60(3) of CA’98. This is the only spot in the judg-
ment where the Guidance Paper is mentioned, but central concepts that it makes
use of are to be seen throughout the judgment. In particular, there are multiple
references to an “as efficient competitor test” that the court tries to perform

































according to the methodology suggested by the Commission.137 In that sense, one
can see an (implicit) judicial acknowledgment of a soft instrument’s contents
without an explicit reference to it in the body of the judgment proper.
Other types of recognition
The above-discussed Nestlé v Mars case is significant not only for its implicit
engagement with the contents of the Guidance Paper, but also for its judicial treat-
ment of the Vertical Guidelines, which the court explicitly engaged with, no
further motivation to this effect given. This is one of the cases where a single judg-
ment employs more than one soft instrument, with a differing interpretative
outcome per type of soft law instrument. Therefore, it is discussed in both the pre-
vious and current sub-sections.
The claim of Nestlé with regard to the MOP was that it either constituted an
abusive rebate under Article 24 DCA, or an unlawful category management agree-
ment between Mars and gas stations under Article 6 DCA. At the beginning of the
assessment of the second allegation, the court holds that the appraisal of whether or
not theMOP is contrary to Article 6 DCA should happen on the basis of the Vertical
Guidelines, “where the European Commission had laid out the principles for assess-
ment of vertical agreements”.138 No further substantiation as to why this should be
the case is offered, although the reasoning in the rest of this claim is entirely based on
citations to relevant paragraphs of the Vertical Guidelines.139 This seemingly
“stand-alone” engagement with the guidelines that does not seek support in either
pertinent case nor hard law could be explained in light of the above-cited initial state-
ment of the court that the case will be decided on the basis of Dutch law, “but gui-
dancewill be sought in assessment guides that the EuropeanCommission has issued
with regard toArticles 101 and 102TFEU”.140 It seems that this approach, enshrined
in national law through Article 1 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Dutch
Competition Act, could aid in grounding national judicial discussion of suprana-
tional soft law without further references to pertinent hard law, much like in the
UK. Article 1 to the DCA’s Explanatory Memorandum reads as follows: “the
DCAwill strive to follow EU Competition rules to the greatest extent possible”.141
There is consensus in scholarly writings that this is indeed the policy line followed





141The original text reads: “Dit voorstel van wet strekt ertoe deWet economische mededing-
ing te vervangen door een mededingingswet, die zoveel mogelijk aansluit bij de mededin-
gingsregels van de Europese Gemeenschap.”
142Van Oers (n 57) 243; Sakkers (n 57) 87; JE van den Brink and JCA van Dam, ‘Neder-
landse Bestuursrechters en Unierechterlijke “Beleidsregels”’ (2014) Juni JB Plus 180. The































hereby argued that the existence – in both jurisdictions – of national consistency
obligations working in parallel with the supranational one, allows for national judi-
cial treatment of supranational soft law that very much looks like the engagement
with soft law on the basis of general principles of EU law hypothesized in the pre-
vious section.143
This thesis is supported by further analysis of the Dutch and UK empirical
samples. For instance,144 in the Dutch Batavus saga,145 supranational soft law
was invoked several times on the basis of the above-described consistency con-
struction. In this case, Batavus (a bike producer) had terminated a long-lasting
contractual relationship with the plaintiff – Blokker – that was, among others,
in the business of retail and reparation of bikes. At first instance, it was estab-
lished that the termination by Batavus happened under pressure from a large
rival distributor (Euretco) that was dissatisfied with the low online sale prices
for bikes practised by Blokker. The first-instance court decided in Blokker’s
favour. Batavus appealed. It is important to note that – early on in the appellate
judgment – the court makes a general statement on the interaction of EU and
national competition law, in which context it mentions its views on the role
of Commission-issued soft law in the national domain. The precise formulation
used is as follows,
The court observes that the reading of the DCA is based on EU law (in particular
Article 81 TEC), which means that the terms used in the DCA need to be interpreted
in light of the jurisprudence of the GC and the CJEU, which is, in turn, to a signifi-
cant extent supported by the decisional practice of the European Commission and its
communications and guidelines.146
last author even speaks of a “copy–paste” policy between the EU and Dutch legal orders
when it comes to Article 102 TFEU cases (Article 24 Mw). Doctrine stipulates that
ACM’s compliance with other supranational guidelines is also very high. As to following
the Horizontal Guidelines at national level, see C Hamm, ‘The Netherlands’ in L Davey and
M Holmes (eds), A Practical Guide to National Competition Rules Across Europe (Kluwer
2004) 609, 616. As to the Guidance Paper, see MV, ‘Tussen Vorm en Effect’ (2009) 3
Actualiteiten Mededingingsrecht 52. The Vertical Guidelines are also complied with by
virtue of them being inextricably related to the VBER, which applies in the Netherlands
even in purely national situations. To that effect, see the Opinion of AG Keus in the
Batavus case – HR 16 september 2011, ECLI:NL:PHR:2011:BQ2213 (concl. A-G
Keus). In the UK, the existence of a similar alignment with the VBER for purely national
situations is suggested in a less categorical manner in Rodger and MacCulloch (n 60) 185.
143For a more elaboration on this hypothesis, see Georgieva (n 14).
144For a similar Dutch judicial approach with regard to the 81(3) Guidelines, see Hof
Arnhem 17 november 2009, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2009:BL7079.
145See, in particular, Hof Leeuwarden 06 oktober 2009, ECLI:NL:GHLEE:2009:BJ9567.
The Blokker saga is seen as one of the more important Dutch vertical distribution cases
by scholarship. Refer to T Ottervanger, ‘“The Netherlands”’ in I Kokkoris (ed), Competition

































In this context, the judge engages in a discussion of the contents of the Vertical
Guidelines and the Commission’s De Minimis Notice,147 references to which
are not further explained nor justified. This attitude, again, makes sense in light
of the above-quoted general statement that reflects the national and European con-
sistency obligations.148
With respect to the UK, another exemplary case is Cityhook,149 where, on
grounds of administrative priority, the CMA closed an investigation into a com-
plaint by Cityhook, a small firm specialized in the laying of submarine cables.
The complaint was, among others, of a collective boycott of Cityhook’s business
by bigger competitors. The case closure decision was challenged by Cityhook,
who maintained the CMA had taken an appealable final decision. On appeal,
the CAT held that the decision was not appealable, but what is more important
for this discussion is part of the argumentation used in that regard. In alleging
the case closure decision to be a final decision on the substance (and therefore
appealable), Cityhook argues that the references to “hard-core” infringements in
the final case closure letter should be read to mean “by object” restrictions,
which would imply that the OFT had made a final decision on substance.150 In
order to ascertain the meaning of the term “hard-core” and its relation to the
notion “object restriction”, the CAT refers to the 81(3) Guidelines because – at
the time – there was no case law it could base itself on in that regard. The court
simply states, “we were not cited any jurisprudence of the Community Courts
which uses the term ‘hard-core’”.151 In this situation of sole reliance on soft
law, the CAT bases itself on s.60(3) of the CA‘98, stating that
It appears from the European Commission’s guidance that so-called “hard-core”
restrictions are generally considered by it to have as their object the restriction of com-
petition. However, it would also appear that the category of restrictions by object may
extend beyond the narrow set of so-called “hard-core” restrictions, although normally
the former encompasses the latter. It therefore appears that the term “hard-core” is used
to refer to the most serious object-based infringements of Article 81(1) EC and, by
virtue of Section 60(3) of the 1998 Act, the Chapter 1 prohibition.152
This quotation serves to further support the hypothesis that the national consist-
ency principle is used as a hook that anchors supranational competition soft law
147ibid [25], [27].
148A similar judicial attitude, but with regard to the 81(3) Guidelines, can be seen in Hof
Arnhem 17 november 2009, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2009:BL7079.
149Cityhook Ltd v OFT [2007] CAT 18.
150ibid [249].
151This is indeed because the first mentioning of the term “hard core” by the supranational
courts happened post-2007 (search performed on curia.eu). Thus, in this paragraph, the case
uses soft law with no endorsement in supranational case law (at the time) to make a point/
build an argument.
152[2007] CAT 18 (n 149) [255].































discussion in national judicial reasoning. Support for this claim can also be found
through a simple search on UK databases,153 where, out of 10 judgments mention-
ing s.60(3) of the CA ‘98, 9 actually deal with supranational soft law in one way or
another.
Trends detected in empirical observations
The main trends that could be detected from the above empirical observations
chart out several lines for possible subsequent inquiry and show that – rather
than being different due to the different types of legal system they represent
(civil versus common law) – the Netherlands and the UK mostly converge in
their treatment of supranational soft law.
It is evident that courts in both jurisdictions do not shy away from engaging
positively (no explicit disagreement was detected) with soft law content when
this content can be traced back to relevant supranational hard law. In that
regard, it merits observing that the greatest amount of recognition references
belongs to the Vertical Guidelines, with less for the 81(3) Guidelines and the Hori-
zontal Guidelines. The situation is reverse for the Guidance Paper, which often
gets implicitly or explicitly rejected (refusal for recognition). However, when in
line with hard law, it could also be subject to implicit or explicit endorsement
as evidenced by Dutch judicial practice. This latter phenomenon was not observed
in the UK. The second most judicially rejected instrument are the Horizontal
Guidelines. In both jurisdictions, they get almost as many recognition references
as refusals for recognition. This fact is surprising. While it is true that the new,
2011 version of the Horizontal Guidelines does broaden certain discussions that
were very condensed in the older edition,154 scholarly accounts do not point to
anything at odds with established law.155 In that light, it should be mentioned
that the current version of the Vertical Guidelines also expanded on certain
153The databases used are Westlaw UK and Bailii. Out of a total of 23 UK competition judg-
ments mentioning S.60 between its introduction in 1998 and today (the search was per-
formed with search terms ‘Section 60 of the 1998 Act’), 12 deal extensively with
supranational soft law instruments. Six of them relate to the Commission Fining Guidelines
([2011] CAT 3; [2011] CAT 7; [2011] CAT 9; [2011] CAT 11; [2014] EWHC 1613 (Ch);
[2002] ECC 13) and the other six deal with instruments that form the basis of this study
([2011] CAT 10; [2011] CAT 40; [2008] EWHC 1978 (Ch); [2008] CAT 13; [2007]
CAT 18; [2012] CAT 31).The rest of the judgments that mention both S.60 and soft law
use S.60 either to ground a claim in EU hard law (4 cases: [2015] EWHC 3585
(Admin); [2005] CAT 30; [2011] CAT 13; [2011] CAT 6) or to motivate a deviation
from it (another 4 cases: [2001] EWCA Civ 2021; [2014] EWCA Civ 400; [2011] CAT
14; [2005] SLT 1041).
154Horizontal Guidelines (n 34). For instance, the Information Exchange Section in the new
guidelines is an example of significant expansion and elaboration.
155P Camesasca and A Schmidt, ‘New EC Horizontal Guidelines: Providing Useful Gui-
dance in the Highly Diverse and Complex Field of Competitor Cooperation and Infor-
































concepts that were marginally discussed in the old document, but this fact does not
affect their positive judicial reception.156 In this sense, reasons for the observed
negative treatment instances with regard to the Horizontal Guidelines should be
sought elsewhere.
A possible explanation for the different judicial attitude towards the Horizontal
and Vertical Guidelines could be given by a theory with its origins in sociology –
the so-called “institutionalization” theory. According to Greene,157 who uses
“institutionalization” to explain judicial attitudes to the US Merger Guidelines,
the latter become institutionalized “when they gain sufficient stature that they
become valued in legal arguments by the courts and others, beyond the persuasive
power of the ideas they embody”.158 “Stature” seems to build up the more an
instrument is used in administrative and judicial practice (decisions and judg-
ments),159 the latter two influencing each other to the point where “each successive
version of the guidelines moves the law towards it”.160 In that sense, “the antitrust
guidelines had acquired a power to influence the law because they were the anti-
trust guidelines, and not just because they were good ideas or the pronouncements
of expert federal agencies”.161 While there is no evidence that the Vertical Guide-
lines have reached this stage in the institutionalization process, their more frequent
judicial usage in comparison with other soft law is a fact that has been empirically
ascertained for the national level.162 This increased judicial usage in comparison
with the Horizontal Guidelines might well be due to the fact that – after decentra-
lization – the Commission had committed itself to dealing with all the serious
cartel cases, which therefore do not reach the national level. Thus, more vertical
cases are decided at the national level on average, which gives the Vertical Guide-
lines the opportunity to get institutionalized and probably also acquire a stronger
independent influence over time.
Going back to the trends detected in the empirical second section, the most
curious phenomenon that was found to exist in both jurisdictions was the ability
of judges to engage with supranational competition soft law on the basis of
national statutory-based consistency principles, reflecting their supranational
counterpart – Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003. As seen above, s.60 of the CA
‘98 and Article 1 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the DCA have had the
156As Colomo testifies, all post-Modernization guidelines have expanded their scope in






162On top of the observations for the Netherlands and the UK made above, in France, more
than 80% of the judgments that mention substantive supranational competition soft law deal
with the Vertical Guidelines (35 out of 43 judgments).































effect – among others163 – of enabling supranational soft law to get recognized in
national judicial discourse, thus producing legal effects at the national level. This
judicial endorsement mechanism seems to work like the above-hypothesized rec-
ognition on the basis of general principles of law.164
Finally, it was observed that courts will refuse to recognize a rule enunciated in
a soft instrument and put forward by the parties if – by such an act – that rule could
be seen as forming the ratio decidendi of the judicial decision. Soft law – if it is to
remain soft – should not be a source to inform a ratio.
Conclusions – the “common core” of Dutch and UK judicial recognition of
supranational competition soft law
From the above empirical observations, several conclusions can be made. Firstly,
it is evident from both the findings in the UK and the Netherlands that national
courts are a lot more likely to recognize soft law when it is used together with per-
tinent hard law. Proof was also found for the supposition of likely judicial rejection
if soft law is invoked on a stand-alone basis, especially if the soft law passage
under discussion is not supported by hard law or if it can serve as the ratio of
the judicial decision. Lack of supporting hard law can also provoke judicial
neglect. Finally, while not much empirical support was found for the “persuaded
judiciary” hypothesis, a most curious finding was made with regard to the role of
the UK and Dutch national consistency obligations, which, working together with
their supranational counterpart (Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003), can be used by
national courts to ground supranational competition soft law in national judicial
reasoning.
163In the Netherlands, for instance, this principle has also led to a narrow adherence to supra-
national soft law by the ACM. For instance, the 81(3) Guidelines have literally been trans-
posed into the national legal system. See Plomp (n 49) ch 6. See also the website of the
Dutch Government <http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0033029/geldigheidsdatum_01-09-
2014> accessed September 2015.
164For an elaboration on the mechanics of judicial recognition through the use of general
































Overall, this work’s aim was to delineate the attitudes of the Dutch and UK
national judiciaries towards Commission-issued competition soft law. To do
that, it was initially ventured that, with regard to supranational competition soft
law, courts could take several courses of action – “recognition” (comprising agree-
ment, disagreement or persuasion), and explicit or implicit “refusal for recog-
nition”, the latter denominated “neglect” and the former - “rejection”. In the
empirical part, most of these hypotheses were actually corroborated. Some new
observations were also added to the overall picture. Generally, it transpired that
soft law is indeed being invoked in an array of different manners, whereby not
every instrument is treated in the same way across the jurisdictions under study
or sometimes even within the same jurisdiction. While the Vertical, the Technol-
ogy Transfer and the 81(3) Guidelines generally get positive recognition, the
results are more varied with regard to the Guidance Paper and the Horizontal
Guidelines. The current treatment of the latter two instruments, thus, is not
optimal from the perspective of the principle of enforcement consistency and
the concomitant legal certainty and uniform application.
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Appendix
Table A1. Table of cases
UK The Netherlands
1. The Racehorse Association and Others
v OFT and The British Horseracing
Board v OFT [2005] CAT 29
1. Batavus v Anonymous Defendant ECLI:
NL:RBLEE:2006:AY9814 (at Rb
Leeuwarden); ECLI:NL:GHLEE:2009:
BJ9567 (at Hof Leeuwaarden); ECLI:NL:
HR:2011:BQ2213 (at Hoge Raad, with
opinion of AG Keus: ECLI:NL:PHR:2011:
BQ2213)
2. Independent Media Support Ltd v
Office of Communications [2008] CAT
13
2. NVM v HPC
ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2012:BX0460 (at Hof
Amsterdam); ECLI:NL:HR:2014:149 (at
Hoge Raad, with opinion of AG Keus:
ECLI:NL:PHR:2013:1108)
3. Bookmakers’ Greyhound
Amalgamated Services et al. v
Amalgamated Racing Ltd et al [2008]
EWHC 1978 (Ch), [2008] EWHC
2688 (Ch) and [2009] EWCA Civ 750
3. Chipsol Holding BV v ACM
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2013:9069
(Continued)

































4. Sel Imperial Ltd v The British
Standards Institution [2010] EWHC
854 (Ch)
4. De Nieuwe Heuvel BV v Koninklijke
Vereniging “Het Friesch Paarden-
Stamboek”
ECLI:NL:GHARN:2009:BL7079
5. Cityhook Ltd v OFT [2007] CAT 18 5. Vereniging Modint v ACM
ECLI:NL:CBB:2005:AU5316 and
Vereniging Nederlandse Textiel Conventie v
Nma
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2004:AR4213
6. Tesco Stores Ltd, Tesco Holdings Ltd,
Tesco Plc v Office of Fair Trading
[2012] CAT 31
6. Anonymous Plaintiff v Stichting Raad voor
de Boomkwekerij en Stichting Erkenningen
Tuinbouw
ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2008:BD3247
7. National Grid Plc v Gas and Electricity
Markets Authority [2010] EWCA Civ
114
7. Sandd BV v ACM ECLI:NL:
RBROT:2013:7337
8. National Grid Electricity Transmission
Plc v ABB Ltd and Others [2012]
EWHC 869 (Ch)
8. CRV Holding BV v ACM
ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BN994
9. Purple Parking Ltd, Meteor Parking
Ltd v Heathrow Airport Ltd [2011]
EWHC 987 (Ch)
9. Service Stations Benschop Woerden BV/




Hoge Raad, with opinion of AG Keus:
ECLI:NL:PHR:2013:875)
10. Calor Gas Ltd v Express Fuels
(Scotland) [2008] CSOH 13
10. Prisma Vastgoed BV/Prisma Food Retail
BV v Slager
ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BJ9439 (with opinion
of AG Keus: ECLI:NL:PHR:2009:
BJ9439)
11. Ineos Vinyls et al v Huntsman
Petrochemicals (UK) Ltd [2006]
EWHC 1241 (Ch)
11. Nestlé Nederland BV v Mars Nederland
BV ECLI:NL:RBOBR:2013:4356
12. Crest Nicholson and ISG Pearce Ltd v
OFT [2011] CAT 10
12. Brink’s Nederland BV v ACM
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:5805
13. Enterprise Inns Plc v Palmerson
Associates Ltd, Paul Rigby, James
Younger [2011] EWHC 3165 Ch
13. Commissariaat voor de Media v SplinQ
B.V.: ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BX9019 (with
opinion of AG Huydecoper here: ECLI:
NL:PHR:2012:BX9019)
14. Unwired Planet International Limited
v Huawei Technologies Co. Limited
[2015] EWHC 2097 (Pat)
14. Jet Set Hydrotechniek BV v Hoffland BV
ECLI:Nl:RBDHA:2015:6346
86 Z. Georgieva
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [
T
ilb
ur
g 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
] 
at
 0
3:
11
 0
2 
A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
